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We consider the question: under what circumstances can the concept2
of adaptation be applied to groups, rather than individuals? Gardner3
and Grafen (2009) develop a novel approach to this question, building on4
Grafen’s ‘formal Darwinism’ project, which defines adaptation in terms5
of links between evolutionary dynamics and optimization. They conclude6
that only clonal groups, and to a lesser extent groups in which reproduc-7
tive competition is repressed, can be considered as adaptive units. We8
re-examine the conditions under which the selection-optimization links9
hold at the group level. We focus on an important distinction between10
two ways of understanding the links, which have different implications11
regarding group adaptationism. We show how the formal Darwinism ap-12
proach can be reconciled with G.C. Williams’ famous analysis of group13
adaptation, and we consider the relationships between group adaptation,14
the Price equation approach to multi-level selection, and the alternative15
approach based on contextual analysis.16
Keywords: adaptation, group adaptation, superorganism, Price’s equa-17
tion, optimality, contextual analysis, G. C. Williams, formal Darwinism, group18
selection19
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Evolutionary biologists usually apply the concept of adaptation to individual24
organisms. However it has long been recognised that in principle, groups might25
also exhibit adaptations. The idea of group adaptation, and the associated con-26
cept of a ‘superorganism’, were famously criticised by G.C. Williams (1966), but27
have since been revived by proponents of ‘multi-level selection’ (Sober & Wilson28
1998; Seeley 1989, 1997; Ho¨lldobler & Wilson 2009). Progress on this topic has29
been hampered by unclarity about how exactly ‘group adaptation’ should be30
defined, how it relates to ‘group selection’, and the conditions under which it31
can evolve. Gardner and Grafen (2009) (hereafter G&G) make a remarkable32
contribution by bringing mathematical precision to these issues, with striking33
results. They do this by applying Grafen’s ‘formal Darwinism’ project, (Grafen34
2002, 2006, 2008), which provides a general framework for understanding the35
concept of adaptation, to groups.36
Our aim here is to take further the analysis of group adaptation, using a37
similar methodology to G&G. We recognise the merits of making the concept38
of group adaptation precise, and share their view that the formal Darwinism39
project offers the best way to do this. However, G&G’s analysis leaves open a40
number of issues. In particular, it is unclear how the concept of group adapta-41
tion they articulate relates to G.C. Williams’ (1966) well-known analysis of the42
concept (cf. Sober and Wilson 2011).43
Our discussion falls into three parts. Firstly, we explore a subtle difference44
between two ways of defining adaptation using the formal Darwinism machinery,45
one used by G&G, the other by Grafen in his earlier papers. The two defintions46
have different implications in general; and as applied to groups, they differ47
on whether clonality, or repression of within-group competition, represent the48
clearest cases of group adaptation.49
Secondly, we study how the formal Darwinism approach can be reconciled50
with G.C. Williams’ distinction between ‘group adaptation’ and ‘fortuitous51
group benefit’. The former refers to a group feature that evolved because it52
benefits the group, the latter to a group feature that happens to benefit the53
group but did not evolve for that reason. (Thus Williams famously contrasted54
a ‘herd of fleet deer’ with a ‘fleet herd of deer’.) Many biologists regard this dis-55
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tinction as crucial, so it is of some interest to see whether the formal Darwinism56
approach to group adaptation can accommodate it.57
Thirdly and relatedly, we consider the relation between the ‘Price equation’58
approach to multi-level selection and the alternative approach based on ‘con-59
textual analysis’. These approaches constitute alternative ways of partitioning60
the total evolutionary change in a structured population into components cor-61
responding to distinct levels of selection. G&G say that their analysis ‘has62
identified Price’s between-group selection as the driver of group adaptation’,63
and thus favour the Price approach (p. 667). We show that the contextual64
approach can also supply a formal definition of group adaptation.65
2 The ‘maximizing agent’ analogy66
G&G’s analysis of group adaptation draws on Grafen’s ‘Formal Darwinism’67
project, which aims to connect optimization and natural selection in a precise68
way, thus formally justifying the intuitive idea that selection leads to organismic69
design (Grafen 2002, 2006, 2008). Grafen’s approach is to use a fully explicit70
definition of optimization, then to prove links between optimality and evolution-71
ary dynamics. The notion of optimization is captured by an ‘objective function’72
that maps an agent’s phenotype to its ‘fitness’ (for some measure of fitness);73
if an agent achieves the maximum value of this function, they are said to ‘be-74
have optimally’. The links state logical connections between the optimality or75
otherwise of agents’ behaviour and the operation of natural selection.76
In Grafen’s original papers, the ‘agents’ are taken to be individual organ-77
isms; this is natural because individuals are usually treated as the bearers of78
adaptations in biology. With this interpretation, the links capture the sense in79
which natural selection leads individuals to be adaptive units, just as Darwin80
originally argued. G&G investigate what happens when the ‘agents’ in Grafen’s81
analysis are instead taken to be groups; their aim is to see whether, and in82
what circumstances, whole groups can legitimately be considered as adaptive83
units, or ‘maximizing agents’. Their main conclusion is that these circumstances84
are relatively rare, because the required links between optimality and natural85
selection only hold under fairly stringent conditions.86
To understand G&G’s argument, the optimality / selection links must be87
laid out explicitly (see Table 1). The first link says that if all agents behave88
optimally, there is no ‘scope’ for selection, i.e. no gene will change in (expected)89
frequency. This makes good sense: if all agents achieve maximum fitness, the90
fitness variance in the population is zero, so no selection will occur. The second91
link says that if all agents behave optimally, there is no ‘potential’ for positive92
selection, which means that no introduced mutant will spread. This also makes93
sense: if all agents achieve maximum fitness, then no mutant can do better. The94
third link says that if all agents behave suboptimally, but equally so, there is no95
scope for selection. Again this makes sense, given that selection requires variance96
in fitness. The fourth link says that if all agents behave suboptimally, but97
equally so, then there is potential for positive selection. This is also intuitive,98
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1. If all agents behave optimally, there is no scope for selection.
2. If all agents behave optimally, there is no potential for positive selection.
3. If all agents behave suboptimally, but equally so, there is no scope for
selection.
4. If all agents behave suboptimally, but equally so, then there is potential
for positive selection.
5. If agents vary in their optimality, then there is scope for selection, and
the change in the frequency of any gene is given by the covariance between
the frequency of that gene in an agent and the agent’s relative fitness.
Table 1: The selection / optimality links
since a mutant phenotype which achieves a higher fitness than the incumbents99
will spread in the population.100
The fifth link is slightly different, in that it describes what will happen if101
the agents vary in their optimality. The link says that if agents vary in their102
optimality, then there is scope for selection, and the change in the frequency of103
any gene is given by the covariance between the frequency of that gene in an104
agent and the agent’s relative fitness. The first part of this is intuitive – non-105
zero variance in fitness implies that natural selection can operate; the second106
part follows from the Price equation with the second term set to zero, described107
below. A sixth link is discussed by G&G, but we do not treat it separately here108
as it is a logical consequence of links four and five taken together (as they note109
in their Appendix.)110
These links may seem obvious, but as Grafen (2002) points out, that is only111
because many biologists simply take for granted that selection leads to opti-112
mization. And in fact, the assumptions that must be made, and the definition113
of ’fitness’ that must be used, in order for the links to be proved are non-trivial114
matters. For example, when the agents are individuals, the absence of mutation115
and gametic selection must be assumed to prove the links; and depending on116
whether the individuals socially interact, different definitions of ‘fitness’ must117
be used (Grafen 2006). So the project is highly non-trivial.118
When the agents are individuals, Grafen speaks of an ’individual as max-119
imising agent’ (IMA) analogy, to capture the idea that individuals behave like120
economically rational agents, attempting to maximise the value of their objec-121
tive function. If all five links hold, the IMA analogy is closely tied to the action122
of natural selection. It is then legitimate to treat individuals as adaptive units,123
Grafen argues, and to regard natural selection as acting to optimize each indi-124
vidual’s phenotype. But where the links do not hold, there is no justification125
for employing the concept of individual adaptation.126
G&G apply a similar logic to groups, by developing a ‘group as maximis-127
ing agent’ (GMA) analogy. They study the conditions under which the five128
links hold, with ‘agents’ understood as groups. These conditions then deter-129
mine when talk of group adaptationism is valid, i.e. when it is legitimate to130
regard groups as adaptive units, and natural selection as acting to optimize131
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the group’s phenotype. So for G&G, the validity of group adaptationism thus132
depends on whether the selection / optimality links hold, where groups are the133
optimizing agents. This yields an understanding of group adaptationism that is134
both conceptually clear and mathematically precise.135
3 The selection / optimality links: ‘actual’ ver-136
sus ‘possible’ definitions137
For the selection / optimality links to be formally proved, they need to be ex-138
pressed mathematically. ‘Optimality’ is defined as maximization of the objective139
function; ‘scope for selection’ and ‘potential for positive selection’ are expressed140
in terms of the evolutionary change in what Grafen (1985) calls ‘p-scores’. For-141
mally a p-score is simply a function from the set of individuals in the population142
to R. In the simplest case a p-score is an indicator function for a particular al-143
lele, indicating the frequency of the allele within an individual (= 0, 1/2 or 1144
for diploids); the average of this p-score over individuals is then the frequency145
of the allele in the population. Any weighted sum of such indicator functions146
also counts as a p-score, is why a p-score can assume any real value. (These147
weighted sums represent breeding values of phenotypic traits; see Grafen (1985,148
2002, 2008) for a full explanation of p-scores.)149
In Grafen’s (2002) discussion of the IMA analogy, and in Grafen (2006), he150
considers the set of all possible p-scores in a population, i.e. all functions from151
the set of individuals to R, irrespective of whether these functions indicate the152
frequency of an allele actually found in the population (or a weighted sum of153
such functions). So even if two individuals are genotypically identical, there is154
still some possible p-score for which they differ. Grafen (2002) then defines ‘no155
scope for selection’, an expression that occurs in links 1 and 3, as ‘no expected156
change in population-wide average p-score, for any possible p-score.’ Let us call157
this definition ‘no scope for selection (possible)’.158
Grafen’s definition of ‘no scope for selection’ may seem odd; surely it would159
be more natural to define it in terms of actual p-scores, rather than all possible160
p-scores? An ‘actual p-score’ may be defined as an indicator function for an allele161
that is actually present in the population (or a weighted sum of such functions).162
So for a given population, the set of actual p-scores is a proper subset of the163
set of all possible p-scores. If ‘no scope for selection’ were defined in terms of164
actual p-scores, it would mean that there whenever there is no expected genetic165
change in a population, there is no scope for selection, and vice-versa. Let us166
call this definition ‘no scope for selection (actual)’.167
The biological meaning of the condition ‘no scope for selection (actual)’ is168
obvious, but what about ‘no scope for selection (possible)’? In effect, the latter169
condition means that no allele actually present in the population will change170
in expected frequency and that no neutral mutations can change in expected171
frequency. (By contrast, ‘no potential for positive selection’ concerns the fate of172
non-neutral mutations.) Conversely, if there is ‘scope for selection (possible)’ in173
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a population, this means that the fitness distribution is such that, if the requisite174
genetic variation were present, there would be expected gene frequency change.175
So although the condition ‘no scope for selection (possible)’ seems odd at first176
sight, referring as it does to non-actual p-scores, it can be given a reasonable177
biological interpretation.178
Moreover, the ‘possible’ defintion is crucial to Grafen’s project. To see why,179
consider link 5 – which says that if agents vary in optimality then there is180
scope for selection. Suppose a population of individuals does exhibit variance in181
optimality (fitness), but is in population-genetic equilibrium. This could be for182
a number of reasons, e.g. overdominance. For example, suppose that individual183
fitness depends exclusively on genotype at a single heterotic locus; assume that184
AA and BB individuals are non-viable, while ABs are viable. So at equilibrium,185
the individuals do vary in optimality. However, at the locus in question there186
will be no evolutionary change; and we may assume that at every other locus,187
all individuals are genotypically identical. So no allele present in the population188
will change in expected frequency; thus there will be no expected change in any189
actual p-score. However, there does exist some possible p-score, e.g. whose value190
is positively correlated with individual fitness, which will change in frequency.191
So for link 5 to be true in the IMA case, ‘no scope for selection’ has to be defined192
with reference to all possible p-scores, rather than just actual p-scores.193
It might be argued that the use of ‘all possible’ p-scores, in the definition of194
‘scope for selection’, is unnecessary, as a referee suggests, for the following rea-195
son. In the overdominance example. there are exactly two possibilities: either196
all individuals are genetically identical at all loci over than the overdominant197
locus (case A), or this is not so (case B). Both possibilities are consistent with198
the model assumptions. If we do not know whether case A or case B obtains,199
then for all we know, there may be an allele actually present in the population200
which will change in expected frequency. Since we cannot rule this out, in this201
sense there is ‘scope for selection’ based solely on change in actual p-scores.202
The problem with this reasoning is that it makes the existence or otherwise203
of ‘scope for selection’ dependent on our knowledge, rather than a matter of204
objective fact. We regards this as undesirable, since the holding of the selection205
/ optimality links, and thus the validity of adaptationism, would then become206
knowledge-relative too. To avoid these untoward consequences, one must allow207
that there is ‘scope for selection’ in both cases A and B above, which is precisely208
what Grafen (2002) achieves by defining ‘scope’ in terms of all possible p-scores.209
So the distinction between ‘actual’ and ‘possible’ p-scores is necessary.210
In the IMA case, it is easy to see that link 5 is the only link that could not211
be proved using the weaker ‘actual’ definition of ‘no scope for selection’, under212
the assumptions of no mutation or gametic selection. (The expression ‘scope for213
selection’ does not occur in links 2 and 4, while links 1 and 3 must hold on the214
‘actual’ definition whenever they hold on the ‘possible’ definition.) However we215
show below that in the GMA case, link 5 can hold even on the ‘actual’ definition216
of ‘no scope for selection’, in certain special cases; and moreover, link 5 can fail217
to hold even on the ‘possible’ definition, in certain other cases.218
If we accept the basic logic of the formal Darwinism approach – that adap-219
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tationism is defined by the five selection / optimality links holding – then the220
distinction between the ‘actual’ and ‘possible’ definitions of ‘scope for selection’221
gives rise to two subtly different forms of adaptationism. It is an open ques-222
tion which is better. Queller and Strassman (2009) have recently argued that223
whether some entity is a ‘unit of adaptation’ depends on the extent of actual,224
not possible, selective processes within that entity. We do not take a stand225
on this issue here. In what follows we do not endorse either of the two defini-226
tions of ‘scope for selection’ as objectively correct, but rather explore the logical227
consequences of both.228
4 Groups as Adaptive Units229
Gardner and Grafen (2009) consider a model of evolution in a structured pop-230
ulation. There are M groups each containing N individuals. Each individual231
has a genotype, a phenotype, and a reproductive success value. Each group232
has a ‘group genotype’, which is an unordered list of the genotypes of its con-233
stituent individuals; group genotype determines group phenotype, which deter-234
mines group reproductive success. As before, a p-score is a function from the235
set of MxN individuals to R.236
The evolutionary change in any p-score is described by the change in the237
average p-score in the population over one generation, which we denote ∆p.238
Gardner and Grafen treat ∆p as a random variable, in order to model uncer-239
tainty, and focus on its expected value. Explicitly incorporating uncertainty240
allows them to handle many biological complexities; however these are not rele-241
vant for our purposes, so to keep the analysis simple we ignore uncertainty and242
talk about the actual change. This is strictly for simplicity; the expected change243
is what really matters, and our results could easily be formulated in such terms.244
Assuming no gametic selection or mutation, ∆p is given by the simplest form245
of the Price equation:246
w∆p = CovIxJ(wij , pij) (1)
where pij and wij are the p-score and the reproductive success of the j
th indi-247
vidual in the ith group respectively; I = {1, . . . ,M} is the set of group indices248
and J = {1, . . . , N} the set of individual indices; and w is average reproductive249
success in the population.250
As is well-known, equation (1) can be expanded into a ‘multi-level’ format,251
by partitioning the total covariance between individual p-score and individual252
reproductive success into between-group and within-group components, yielding253
the result first obtained by Price (1972):254
w∆p = CovI(wi, pi) + EI [CovJ(pij , wij)] (2)
where wi is the average reproductive success of the i
th group, pi the average255
p-score of the ith group. The first term on the RHS is the covariance between256
a group’s average p-score and its group reproductive success; the second term257
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is the average, or expectation, across groups of the within-group covariance258
between individual p-score and individual reproductive success. Equation (2) is259
often regarded as decomposing the total change into components corresponding260
to the effects of ‘group selection’ and ‘individual selection’ respectively. This261
interpretation is standard in the literature on multi-level selection, though it is262
not the only way that these contested terms have been defined.263
It is a familiar point that substantial within-group selection may undermine264
group functionality, thus preventing the group from behaving as an adaptive265
unit (Buss 1987, Maynard Smith & Szathmary 1995, Frank 2003). G&G thus266
consider two models in which within-group selection is completely absent, which267
should consitute a ‘best-case scenario’ for group adaptationism. The first in-268
volves purely clonal groups; the second involves non-clonal groups with full re-269
pression of competition, i.e. no within-group variance in fitness. (By this G&G270
mean no within-group variance in expected, rather than realized, fitness – which271
means that the existence of reproductive division of labour in a group is fully272
compatible with zero within-group variance in fitness. This is one place where273
the distinction between realized and expected fitness, which we are ignoring for274
simplicity, is important.)275
If there is no within-group selection on a given p-score, the second RHS term276
of equation (2) will be zero, in which case it reduces to277
w∆p = CovI(wi, pi) (3)
Clearly, equation (3) will apply to any p-score that shows no within-group278
variance. So in the clonal groups model, equation (3) will apply to all actual279
p-scores. Similarly, equation (3) will apply whenever there is no within-group280
variance in fitness, as in the repression of competition model. Both models imply281
that for each group, the within-group covariance between fitness and p-score is282
zero, and thus the average of this covariance across groups is also zero.283
G&G then claim that in both of these models, the links between the GMA284
analogy and gene frequency change do obtain (with one proviso), so group adap-285
tationism is valid. This is the central positive claim of their paper. The reason286
the links hold in these models, they claim, is that the assumption of no within-287
group selection renders equation (3) applicable, which in turn allows the five288
links to be proved, with the objective function taken to be group fitness, i.e.289
the average fitness of the individuals in the groups. By contrast, when within-290
group selection is not assumed absent, so the full Price equation (2) must be291
applied, none of the links can be proved, so it is not legitimate to regard groups292
as adaptive units.293
The proviso concerns link 4 in the repression of competition model (which294
says that if all agents behave equally suboptimally, then at least one mutant295
can spread). This need not be true, G&G argue, because although an improved296
group phenotype is possible at the suboptimal equilibrium, “there is no guaran-297
tee that the corresponding genetic variants will arrange themselves together in298
groups in such a way as to give rise to the desired group phenotype” (p. 665).299
In the clonal case this problem doesn’t arise, since any group phenotype can300
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be produced by a single genetic variant. So they regard talk of group adap-301
tation as fully justifiable in the clonal case, but only partly justifiable in the302
repression-of-competition case.303
The significance of this consideration is debatable, since a parallel problem304
arguably applies at the individual level too. In Grafen (2002), where link 4 is305
proved for individuals, it is simply assumed that any non-resident phenotype306
can be produced by a genetic variant – even though this may require several307
simultaneous mutations at different loci. A parallel assumption could be made308
in the group case, i.e. that any non-resident group phenotype will be produced309
by mutation, even if this requires several individuals to mutate simultaneously310
– in which case link 4 would be true. It may be that the required assumption311
is less plausible in the group than the individual case, but this is an empirical312
matter. Therefore, we are inclined to regard link 4 as equally defensible, in313
principle, in both the repression-of-competition and clonal models. But nothing314
in what follows turns on this.315
5 Clonality versus Repression of Competition316
Aside from the proviso concerning link 4, G&G treat clonal groups and compet-317
itively repressed groups on a par. However, there is actually a logical difference318
between them with respect to links 1 and 3. For simplicity we focus on link 1,319
which to recall says that if all groups are optimal, then there is no scope for320
selection. Recall the distinction between the ‘actual’ and ‘possible’ definitions321
of ‘no scope for selection’ from section 3. If we adopt Grafen’s original ‘possible’322
definition, it turns out that link 1 is true in the repression of competition model323
but not in the clonal groups model.324
Repression of competition implies that there is no within-group variance in325
fitness. (We do not take this condition to define repression of competition,326
for it is possible that within-group fitnesses may be equal anyway. Repression327
is a causal mechanism for bringing this about.) The absence of within-group328
variance in fitness can be expressed by V arJ(wij) = 0 for all groups i. This329
implies that for every possible p-score, CovJ(wij , pij) = 0 in each group i, which330
implies that equation (3) above describes the evolutionary dynamics of each p-331
score. Link 1 then follows immediately; since if all groups are optimal then there332
is no variance in group fitness, so equation (3) tells us that ∆p = 0 for every333
possible p-score.334
Now consider clonality. Note firstly that clonal groups cannot be defined as335
V arJ(pij) = 0 for all possible p-scores and all groups i, i.e. no within-group336
variance in any possible p-score in any group. For this condition is logically337
unsatisfiable, given that the set of possible p-scores is the set of all functions338
from the set of individuals to R. That groups are clonal means the absence of339
within-group variance in any actual p-score. But there will be many possible340
p-scores that do show within-group variance, even if the groups are clonal.341
This means that the condition CovJ(wij , pij) = 0 in each group i does not342
hold for every possible p-score in the clonal group model, unlike in the repression343
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of competition model (see Appendix 1). Of course, even if that condition does344
not hold for a given p-score, equation (3) could still apply to that p-score if the345
weaker condition EI [CovJ(wij , pij)] = 0 holds, i.e. the average over groups of346
the within-group covariances is zero. However, this latter condition cannot hold347
true for all p-scores, unless within-group fitnesses are equal. (See Appendix 2,348
Propostion 2, for proof.)349
This means that on the ‘possible’ definition of scope for selection, link 1 only350
holds in the clonal groups model if there is no variance in within-group fitnesses351
in any group. Consider a case where the groups are clonal but within-group352
fitnesses do vary. In this case, it is not true that if all groups are optimal,353
∆p = 0 for every possible p-score. It will always be possible to find a p-score354
for which the condition EI [CovJ(wij , pij)] = 0 does not hold, and for which355
∆p will be non-zero. So even if all groups are optimal, there will always be356
scope for selection unless within-group fitnesses are equal in each group. In357
fact, the absence of within-group variance in fitness turns out to be necessary358
and sufficient for all the links to hold, as we show in section 7.359
In a clonal groups scenario, it is of course possible that within-group fitnesses360
will be equal. This will be so if individual fitness depends only on individual361
genotype. But this need not be true. There are various reasons why the members362
of a clonal group may differ in fitness (aside from chance), e.g. they may receive363
different amounts of social help. It might still be argued that their expected364
fitnesses will be equal, but this depends on how exactly the states of the world,365
over which the expectation is taken, are defined. In any case, even if it is366
assumed that clonal group mates have the same expected fitness, in which case367
link 1 will hold on the ‘possible’ definition of scope for selection, it is important368
to realise that it is not clonality but rather the absence of within-group fitness369
variance that is responsible for the link holding.370
Since G&G hold that there can be no scope for selection within clonal groups,371
in virtue of the clonality, it is clear that they are employing the ‘actual’ definition372
of ‘scope for selection’, on which links 1 and 3 do indeed hold for clonal groups.373
This definition is perfectly reasonable, but as we saw in section 3, adopting374
it complicates the formal Darwinism approach to individual adapation, as it375
makes link 5 logically stronger and thus harder to satisfy. In the group case,376
adopting the ‘actual’ definition of scope for selection similarly strengthens link377
5; as a result, repression of within-group competition no longer suffices for link378
5 to hold, but clonality does.379
To understand this, consider the following example. A population contains380
asexual individuals of two genotypes, A and B, living in groups of size N = 4.381
Groups are competitively repressed, so within each group all individuals have the382
same fitness. The population contains exactly three types of group: (AAAA),383
(BBBB) and (AABB); the group fitness function is non-linear, and is such384
that w(AABB) > w(BBBB) = w(AAAA). (This is a group-level analogue of385
over-dominance.) As a result, the population is in equilibrium – no gene will386
change in frequency – but the groups do vary in fitness (optimality). So link387
5, which says that if the groups vary in fitness then there is scope for selection,388
need not be true for competitively repressed groups under the ‘actual’ definition389
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‘Possible’ definition ‘Actual’ definition
Individual Links 1–5 X Links 1–4 X, link 5 x
Group–Clonality Links 2,4,5 X, links 1,3 x ∗ Links 1–5 X ∗∗
Group–Repression Links 1–5 X Links 1–4 X, link 5 x
Table 2: Conditions under which the links hold.
* Links 1 and 3 will hold if clonal group mates have identical fitness.
** Link 5 will fail if group fitness does not depend only on group genotype.
of scope for selection.390
This counterexample to link 5 depends essentially on the groups being non-391
clonal. This is because for there to be a polymorphic equilbrium with fitness392
differences between groups, it is essential that some groups contain individuals393
of different genotypes, given that group fitness depends only on group geno-394
type. Therefore, in the clonal groups model, adopting the ‘actual’ defintion of395
scope for selection does not allow a counterexample to link 5 to be constructed.396
(Note however that if the assumption that group fitness depends only on group397
genotype were relaxed, then link 5 would fail even in the clonal case.)398
The upshot is that depending on whether we use the ‘possible’ or the ‘actual’399
definition of scope for selection, the selection / optimality links will hold true400
under different conditions. These differences are summarized in Table 2, for401
both the individual and group models, under the standard assumptions of no402
mutation and no gametic selection.403
What should we conclude from this? In one respect competitively repressed404
groups constitute the better case for group adaptationism, but in another respect405
clonal groups do. If we adopt the ‘possible’ definition of scope for selection,406
then repression of competition guarantees that links 1-5 hold, but clonality407
does not. Some biologists would regard this as welcome result. Queller and408
Strassman (2009) have argued that a clonal group should not automatically409
be regarded as a superorganism, if it shows no functional integration and no410
social interaction among its constituent individuals; see also Ratnieks and Reeve411
(1992). In a similar vein, Michod (1999) argues that true higher-level individuals412
(or superorganisms) must possess mechanisms for conflict suppression. By these413
authors’ lights, an analysis of group adaptation that privileges repression of414
competition is independently desirable.415
However if we adopt the ‘actual’ definition of scope for selection, then clonal416
groups emerge as the better candidate for the superorganism mantle. On this417
defintion, link 5 fails in the repression of competition model but holds in the418
clonal groups model (so long as group fitness is assumed to be a function of419
group genotype). This consideration provides a possible basis, over and above420
the argument given by G&G in relation to link 4, for treating clonality as the421
‘best case’ for group adaptationism.422
The dichotomy between clonality and repression of within-group competi-423
tion, as means for unfiying the evolutionary interests of group members, has424
relevance in relation to ‘major evolutionary transitions’. Multi-cellular organ-425
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isms typically employ both means; their constituent cells are usually genetically426
identical, and the fairness of meiosis serves to repress reproductive competition427
between the genes within a single genome, in sexual species. Indeed the assump-428
tion of fair meiosis, i.e. the absence of gametic selection, is precisely why links429
1 and 3 hold true in the individual model of Grafen (2002), on the ‘possible’430
definition of scope for selection.431
We take no stand on whether the ‘actual’ or ‘possible’ defintion of scope432
for selection is preferable, nor therefore on whether clonality or repression of433
competition constitutes the better case of group adaptationism. Our aim has434
been to explore the logic of formal Darwinism as applied to groups, under both435
definitions. However in what follows we focus on Grafen’s original ‘possible’436
definition, not because we think it is intrinsically superior, but because it allows437
us to find necessary and sufficient conditions, that are biologically meaningful,438
for links 1-5 to hold.439
6 Group Adaptation versus Fortuitous Group440
Benefit441
In Adaptation and Natural Selection, G.C. Williams (1966) distinguished be-442
tween ‘group adaptation’ and ‘fortuitous group benefit’, as part of his celebrated443
attack on group selectionism. The former refers to a group feature that evolved444
because it benefits the group, the latter to a group feature that happens to445
benefit the group but did not evolve for that reason. So on Williams’ view,446
whether a particular feature constitutes a group adaptation depends crucially447
on its causal history. A clonal group of non-social aphids, or of some marine448
invertebrate species, would not count as group adaptation by Williams’s lights,449
for the members of such groups engage in no social behaviour, and the groups450
exhibit little or no functional organization. If some such groups do better than451
others, this is most likely a side-effect of differences in individual adaptedness.452
How does Williams’ influential concept of group adaptation relate to the453
concept defined by the formal Darwinism approach of G&G? The concepts are454
clearly different; G&G hold that group adaptationism applies to any clonal455
group, while Williams explicitly rules out some clonal groups. From Williams’456
viewpoint, the five selection / optimality links which G&G take to define group457
adaptation could hold ‘for the wrong reason’, i.e. as a side-effect of individual-458
level processes. This would be so in a case in which there is no within-group459
variation in fitness, and the individuals in each group engage in no social be-460
haviour. Williams would categorize this as fortuitous group benefit, not group461
adaptation.462
This difference between G&G’s and Williams’ concepts may seem puzzling,463
since Williams’ point was precisely that a trait only counts as group adaptation464
if it has evolved by a process of group-level selection; and G&G define ‘group465
selection’ as “that part of gene-frequency change that is responsible for group466
adaptation” (p.667). So where does the difference stem from?467
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The answer is that G&G identify ‘group selection’ with the between-group468
component of the multi-level Price equation, i.e. the term CovI(wi, pi) in equa-469
tion (2); while a proponent of Williams’ view must reject this defintion. As many470
authors have pointed out, the multi-level Price equation is arguably a flawed471
way to decompose the total change into components corresponding to distinct472
levels of selection (Grafen 1984, Nunney 1985, Heisler & Damuth 1987, Good-473
night et al. 1992; Okasha 2004, 2006). The basic problem is that the covariance474
between group p-score and group fitness may be positive even in the absence475
of any causal relation between these variables; groups with a high p-score may476
be fitter, simply because they contain a higher proportion of intrinsically fit477
individuals, even if there is no group effect on fitness, and no social behaviour.478
Arguably it is unhelpful to speak of ‘group selection‘ in such a circumstance;479
individual selection is responsible for the entirety of the evolutionary change.480
This is a close corollary of Williams’ point that group-beneficial features may481
arise as a side-effect of individual selection.482
If we accept that group and individual selection should not be identified with483
the components of the multi-level Price equation, then what decomposition of484
the evolutionary change should be used to define them? One promising approach485
is to use ‘contextual analysis’, a form of multiple regression analysis (cf. Heisler486
& Damuth 1987). This permits a solution to the problem that besets the Price487
approach (i.e. the multi-level decomposition in equation (2)), by isolating the488
effect of a trait on group fitness once individual effects have been stripped away.489
The total change can still be partitioned into two components, corresponding490
to the two levels of selection. The crucial difference with the Price approach491
is that contextual analysis only identifies a component of group selection when492
there is a ‘group effect’ on individual fitness. The method is described fully in493
section 7.494
G&G discuss contextual analysis, but appear to regard the distinction be-495
tween the Price and contextual approaches as merely semantic. Clearly it is a496
semantic matter how we use the expressions ‘group selection’ and ‘individual497
selection’, but the question of whether the causal action of natural selection op-498
erates at the individual or group level is non-semantic. We accept G&G’s idea499
that group selection should be defined as the part of gene-frequency change that500
is responsible for group adaptation, but we show in section 8 that this does not501
discriminate between the Price and the contextual definitions of group selection.502
Some biologists might simply reject Williams’ distinction outright, and thus503
reject the idea that the selection / optimality links might hold ‘for the wrong504
reason’. Anyone doing this would naturally accept the Price decomposition, and505
G&G’s analysis. However many authors, ourselves included, regard Williams’506
distinction between group adaptation and fortuitous group benefit as important.507
We show in section 9 that accepting this view does not mean abandoning the508
formal Darwinism approach altogether.509
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7 Price’s Equation versus Contextual Analysis510
Contextual analysis treats every individual in the population as having two trait511
values, an individual p-score and the p-score of the group it belongs to. The512
key question is then whether there is an association between fitness and group513
p-score that does not result from an association between fitness and individual514
p-score. This is assessed with a linear regression model:515
wij = β1pij + β2pi + eij (4)
where β1 is the partial regression of individual fitness on individual p-score,516
controlling for group p-score; β2 is the partial regression of individual fitness on517
group p-score, controlling for individual p-score; and eij is the residual whose518
variance is to be minimized. Therefore β2 is the change in individual fitness that519
would result if the group p-score of an individual of fixed p-score were changed520
by one unit – it measures the extent to which differences in group p-score explain521
differences in individual fitness, holding individual p-score constant.522
If β2 is zero, this means that an individual’s fitness depends only on its own523
p-score, so any covariance between group p-score and fitness is a side-effect of524
individual selection. Intuitively this means that individual selection is the only525
force affecting the evolution of the p-score in the population – at least if we526
follow Grafen (1984) in defining ‘individual selection’ in terms of an action’s527
‘effects on the actor’s number of offspring alone’ (p.83-4). This means that for528
group selection to operate, β2 must be non-zero.529
It is natural to interpret β1 and β2 as measures of the direct causal influ-530
ence of individual p-score and group p-score, respectively, on individual fitness.531
However this interpretation is only valid if the true dependence of wij on pij532
and pi is linear (as for example in a linear public goods game). Of course, even533
if the true dependence is non-linear, it is possible to apply equation (4); but in534
that case the partial regression coefficients cannot be construed as measures of535
direct causal influence.536
Using contextual analysis, we can partition the evolutionary change in p-537
score into two components, corresponding to individual and group selection as538
understood here. To do this, we simply substitute equation (4) into (1). After539
simplifying, this gives:540
w∆p = β2CovIxJ(pij , pi) + β1V arIxJ(pij)
= β2V arI(pi) + β1V arIxJ(pij) (5)
Equation (5) constitutes an alternative to the Price decomposition given in541
equation (2), which to recall is:542
w∆p = CovI(wi, pi) + EI [CovJ(pij , wij)] (2)
Note that equations (2) and (5) are both true; but they slice up the to-543
tal change in different ways. Which equation we favour depends on whether544
we think ‘individual selection’ and ‘group selection’ should be understood as545
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within-group and between-group selection, or as selection on the component of546
individual fitness that is due to differences in individual p-score, and to differ-547
ences in group p-score.548
The contextual approach to multi-level selection, enshrined in (5), tallies549
neatly with Williams’ point that ‘fortuitous group benefit’ and group adap-550
tation are different matters. In cases of fortuitous group benefit, a trait (or551
p-score) that is individually advantageous leads to an incidental benefit for the552
group; so group p-score will covary positively with the fitness of both indi-553
viduals and groups. But this association goes away if we control for individual554
p-score, as it alone affects individual fitness; therefore β2 is zero. On the contex-555
tual approach, the evolutionary change is then solely attributable to individual556
selection, whereas the Price approach wrongly detects a component of group557
selection.558
One limitation of the contextual approach is that if a particular p-score559
shows no variation within groups, then the partial regression coefficients β1560
and β2 are undefined. This is because the absence of within-group variance in561
p-score means that an individual’s p-score and the p-score of their group are562
perfectly colinear – so it is impossible to compare the difference in fitness of two563
individuals with the same group p-score but different individual p-scores, and564
vice-versa. Although equation (5) cannot be applied in such a circumstance, it565
still makes sense to ask whether there is a direct causal link between individual566
(or group) p-score and fitness; it is just that the this causal question cannot be567
answered by purely statistical means.568
Now recall the GMA analogy, i.e. the selection / optimality links where the569
agents are groups. It is because G&G find a close relationship between these570
links holding and the absence of within-group selection, i.e. CovJ(pij , wij) = 0571
for all groups i, that they regard group adaptationism as intimately related to572
the Price approach. If one is persuaded by the alternative contextual approach,573
it is natural to ask what the relation is between the links holding and the absence574
of individual selection as defined by contextual analysis, i.e. β1 = 0 (cf. Foster575
2009).576
A first step towards answering this question is to consider the relation be-577
tween the absence of within-group selection and the absence of individual selec-578
tion in the contextual sense. Since the Price and contextual partitions slice up579
the total change differently, one might think that the absence of within-group580
selection would be logically unrelated to the absence of individual selection in581
the contextual sense. Surprisingly, it turns out that this is not so.582
In Appendix 2 (Proposition 1), we show that the following relation holds. For583
a particular p-score, if there is no within-group selection on that p-score, then584
either β1 = 0 or else the p-score shows no within-group variance – in which case585
β1 and β2 are undefined. Conversely, if β1 = 0, or if the p-score shows no within-586
group variance, it follows that there is no change due to within-group selection,587
i.e. the average across groups of the within-group covariance between p-score588
and individual fitness is zero. But this does not imply that CovJ(pij , wij) = 0589
for all groups i. So in short, for a given p-score, “no within-group selection”590
implies “no individual selection (contextual) or the p-score shows no within-591
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no within-group selection ∀i CovJ(pij , wij) = 0
no change due to within-group selection EI [CovJ(pij , wij)] = 0
no individual selection in the contextual sense β1 = 0
no within-group variance in fitness ∀i V arJ(wij) = 0
no within-group variance in p-score ∀i V arJ(pij) = 0
Table 3: Conditions on a single p-score
group variance”, but not vice-versa.592
One might conclude from this that if the absence of within-group selection593
characterizes group adaptationism, as G&G hold, then the absence of individual594
selection in the contextual sense cannot also characterize it. But this does not595
follow, if we adopt the ‘possible’ definition of scope for selection, discussed596
above. For surprisingly, when all possible p-scores are considered, the difference597
in logical strength between the conditions ‘no within-group selection’ and ‘no598
individual selection (contextual)’ disappears. We show this in the next section.599
8 Main Results600
In this section we outline our main results; full proofs are in Appendix 2. We601
continue to use the basic G&G model of evolution in a structured population602
outlined in section 3; notation remains unchanged. As before, gametic selection603
and mutation are assumed absent, and uncertainty is ignored. (This latter604
restriction could easily be relaxed.) In Table 3, we write formal definitions605
of the following conditions on a given p-score: “no within-group selection”, “no606
change due to within-group selection”, “no individual selection in the contextual607
sense”, and “no within-group variance in fitness”, and “no within-group variance608
in p-score”. These conditions bear interesting logical relations to one another.609
Proposition 1. For any given p-score, the following logical implications hold:610
“no within-group variance in fitness”611
⇒ “no within-group selection”612
⇒ “no change due to within-group selection”613
⇔ “no individual selection (contextual)” or “no within-group vari-614
ance in p-score”615
Note that the first two of these implications hold in one direction only, but616
the last is an equivalence.617
We now consider all possible p-scores, and write formal definitions for the618
corresponding conditions in Table 4. Importantly, the condition “no within-619
group variance in any p-score” can never be satisfied, for reasons noted earlier.620
Similarly, the condition “no individual selection in the contextual sense on any621
p-score” can never be satisfied - because β1 will be undefined for any p-score that622
shows no within-group variance. Note also that the condition “no within-group623
variance in fitness” for a single p-score, and the corresponding condition on all624
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no within-group selection on any p-score ∀p ∀i CovJ(pij , wij) = 0
no change due to within-group selection in any p-score ∀p EI [CovJ(pij , wij)] = 0
no individual selection in the contextual sense on any p-score ∀p β1 = 0
no within-group variance in fitness for any p-score ∀i V arJ(wij) = 0
no within-group variance in any p-score ∀p ∀i V arJ(pij) = 0
Table 4: Conditions on all p-scores
p-scores, are identical; since the variable ‘p’ does not occur in the expression625
‘V arJ(wij)’. (In the remainder of this section, ‘all p-scores’ refers to all possible626
p-scores, i.e. all functions from the set of individuals to R.)627
Our main result is that the following logical relations obtain between the628
conditions on all p-scores:629
Proposition 2.630
“no within-group variance in fitness”631
⇔ “no within-group selection on any p-score”632
⇔ “no change due to within-group selection in any p-score”633
⇔ “for each p-score, either no individual selection (contextual) or634
no within-group variance in that p-score”635
Note that each of these implications holds in both directions, i.e. they are636
equivalences. This is a striking result, given that two of the corresponding637
implications for a single p-score hold only in the left-right direction. To un-638
derstand this, consider the first equivalence, between “no within-group variance639
in fitness” and “no within-group selection on any p-score”. In the left-to-right640
direction, this is trivial. To see that it holds in right-to-left direction, suppose641
that fitnesses vary in at least one group. It is then possible to define a p-score642
which will be subject to selection within that group, simply by assigning 1 to643
each individual who is at least as fit as the group average, and 0 to every other644
individual. Therefore, the only way that there can be no within-group selection645
on any p-score is if there is no within-group variance in fitness. (This is why646
repression of competition, but not all groups being clonal, is sufficient for link647
1 to hold.) See Figure 1 for an illustration of this point.648
The second equivalence, between “no within-group selection on any p-score”649
and “no change due to within-group selection in any p-score”, holds for essen-650
tially the same reason. Although any particular p-score can exhibit no change651
due to within-group selection even if it is subject to within-group selection, if652
all possible p-scores exhibit no change due to within-group selection this can653
only be because fitnesses are equal in each group, which implies the absence of654
within-group selection on any p-score.655
Next, consider the relation between the selection / optimality links holding656
(on the ‘possible’ definition of scope for selection), and the above conditions.657
It is easy to see that if there is no within-group selection on any p-score, then658
links 1, 2 and 3 hold, where the ‘agents’ are groups and the objective function is659






A, B, C 
P1 
P2 
      1: Population with within-group variance in fitness       2: Population without within-group variance in fitness 
      A: All possible p-scores 
      B: p-scores satisfying EI[CovJ(wij,pij)]=0 
      C: p-scores satisfying CovJ(wij,pij)=0 for all groups i 
Figure 1: The left-hand box depicts a population in which there is within-group
variance in fitness. The set of all possible p-scores is A. The set of p-scores for which
there is no within-group selection is C. The set of p-scores for which there is no change
due to within-group selection is B. Crucially, for any p-score in B but not in C, such
as p1, one can find another p-score in A but not in B, such as p2 (see Lemma 2 in
Appendix 2.) So in a population for which A=B, there can be no p-scores in B but
not in C, i.e. the sets A, B, and C co-incide. Moreover, the only way in which A can
equal B, is if there is no within-group variance in fitness, as in the right-hand box (see
Proposition 2).
analysis in relation to all actual p-scores; see their Appendix.) We argued in661
section 4 that link 4 also holds in the absence of within-group selection on any662
p-score, and we showed in section 5 that link 5 holds in the same circumstance.663
Therefore, the absence of within-group selection on any p-score is sufficient for664
all the links to hold. Our results show that the absence of within-group selection665
on any p-score is equivalent to no within-group variance in fitness; so the latter666
condition is also sufficient for the links to hold.667
What conditions are necessary for the links to hold? G&G do not explicitly668
discuss this; they say only that if there is within-group selection on some p-score,669
then the links are “not proven”, which is weaker than saying that they do not670
hold. But the latter is in fact true. If there is within-group selection on some671
p-score, it is easy to show that not all of the five links can be true. In fact,672
something stronger can be shown, namely that either link 1, 3 or 5 must fail;673
see Appendix 2. So links 1, 3 and 5 jointly imply the absence of within-group674
selection on any p-score, which as we have seen is equivalent to the absence of675
within-group variance in fitness. Thus the latter condition is necessary for links676
1, 3 and 5 to hold, and is thus necessary for all the links to hold.677
This result is interesting, since it shows that the five links are not logically678
independent. For since links 1, 3, and 5 together imply the absence of within-679
group variance in fitness, which itself is a sufficient condition for all the links680
to hold – granting our argument about link 4 – it follows that links 1, 3 and 5681
19
imply links 2 and 4. Therefore, G&G’s characterization of group adaptationism,682
in terms of all five links holding, could in fact be re-expressed as links 1, 3 and683
5 holding. This is not a criticism; to characterize a concept axiomatically one684
does not have to use the smallest possible axiom set; some redundancy in the685
axioms can be illuminating.686
Therefore, granting our argument about link 4, we arrive at the following:687
Proposition 3. “links 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 hold”688
⇔ “links 1, 3, and 5 hold”689
⇔ “no within-group variance in fitness”690
⇔ “no within-group selection on any p-score”691
⇔ “no change due to within-group selection in any p-score”692
⇔ “for each p-score, either no individual selection (contextual)693
or no within-group variance in that p-score”694
These equivalences explain our claim in the previous section that the Price695
equation approach to multi-level selection, enshrined in equation (2), has no696
particular link to group adaptationism, if the latter is defined as the links hold-697
ing. For while it is possible to characterize the five links holding in terms of698
components of equation (2), as “no change due to within-group selection in any699
p-score”, it is equally possible to characterize their holding in terms of contex-700
tual analysis, by referring only to the parameter β1 of equation (5). For the701
condition “for each p-score, either no individual selection (contextual) or no702
within-group variance in that p-score” can be re-expressed as “for each p-score,703
either β1 = 0 or β1 is undefined”. So the G&G analysis of group adaptation-704
ism, under the ‘possible’ definition of scope for selection, provides no particular705
reason to favour the Price over the contextual approach to defining levels of706
selection.707
9 G. C. Williams strikes back708
We argued above that anyone accepting G.C. Williams’ concept of group adap-709
tation should distinguish between the selection / optimality links holding for the710
‘right’ and the ‘wrong’ reason.The links will hold for the ‘wrong’ reason where711
there is no group functional integration and no social behaviour among individu-712
als; but the individuals in each group happen to be equally well-adapted. This is713
an example of fortuitous group benefit, for Williams, and contrasts with genuine714
group adaptation. This means that Williams’ concept of group adaptationism715
should be defined as ‘the links hold + X’. But what is ‘X’?716
Intuitively, ’X’ refers to the fact of group-level functional integration, e.g.717
the existence of a mechanism for repression of reproductive competition. The718
key distinction is between a case where within-group fitnesses are equalized by719
some such mechanism, and a case where they just happen to be equal, e.g.720
because the groups are clonal and individual fitness depends only on individual721
genotype. In the former case the individuals in each group share a common722
fate; in the latter case they merely have identical fates.723
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We introduced contextual analysis, as opposed to the Price approach, pre-724
cisely to capture Williams’ distinction. However the results of the last section725
show that, on the ‘possible’ definition of scope for selection, the links holding726
can be characterized using either the Price or the contextual approaches. So727
the contextual approach, as outlined above, cannot itself capture the elusive728
condition ’X’. So how should an advocate of Williams’ concept proceed?729
A natural suggestion is to modify contextual analysis by introducing a coun-730
terfactual test. Consider a simple example in which an individual’s fitness de-731
pends only on a single genetic locus. There are two alleles at the locus, one732
of which confers a fitness advantage. All individuals in a group have the same733
allele, but there is between-group variance. So within-group fitnesses are equal,734
but not because of a group-level effect; so the links hold for the wrong reason.735
Consider a p-score which indicates presence or absence of the superior allele.736
Since this p-score shows no within-group variance, β1 is undefined. So although737
individual fitness depends only on individual genotype, contextual analysis can-738
not detect this due to insufficient genetic variation.739
A solution is to consider what would happen if genetic variation were intro-740
duced within groups. Suppose that one or more individuals had their genotype741
changed at the locus in question, in a way that leads to within-group variation.742
This will also change the fitness distribution in the population. Consider the743
new p-score, denoted p′, that indicates presence or absence of the superior al-744
lele in this modified population. Since p′ does vary within groups, β′1 is now745
defined, so contextual analysis can reveal that individual fitness depends solely746
on individual genotype, not on group effects, i.e. β′1 6= 0. This shows that in the747
original population, the absence of within-group variance in fitness, and thus748
the holding of the links, was not due to a mechanism for repressing reproductive749
competition, but arose simply because of the absence of within-group variance750
in the crucial genotype.751
We can generalize this example into an abstract characterization of what752
it means for the links to hold ‘for the right reason’. Consider all the actual753
p-scores in the population. Take the subset of the actual p-scores that show754
no within-group variance, for which β1 is undefined. (This subset will be non-755
empty in the cases that we are trying to rule out.) For each of these p-scores, we756
introduce within-group genetic variation in the allele that the p-score represents,757
by modifying the genotypes of one or more individuals. This results in a new758
set of actual p-scores, to which contextual analysis can be applied again, and for759
which the β′1 coefficients must be well-defined. If the links hold for the ‘wrong’760
reason, as in the example above, at least one of these β′1 coefficients will be761
non-zero. If they hold for the ‘right’ reason, each of the coefficients will be zero,762
indicating that in the original population, the absence of within-group fitness763
variance did not arise simply because the alleles on which individual fitness764
depended were fixed in each group, so must have been due to a mechanism for765
repression of reproductive competition.766
So Williams’ concept of group adaptationism can be defined as ‘the links767
holding for the right reason’. We saw above that ‘the links holding‘ is equivalent768
to “for each p-score, either β1 = 0 or β1 is undefined”. The ‘right reason’ can be769
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characterized as follows: “for all actual p-scores for which β1 is undefined, β
′
1 =770
0”. The conjunction of these conditions thus defines group adaptationism a` la771
Williams. This definition ensures that the distinction between group adaptation772
and fortuitous group benefit is respected. In a case of fortuitous group benefit,773
the links may hold but will not hold for the right reason, and our counterfactual774
test will detect this. Where the links hold for the right reason, the covariance775
between group p-score and group fitness, that appears in equation (2), is not776
simply a side effect of individual selection, but reflects a direct casual influence777
of group p-score on group fitness. This fits well with Williams’ insistence that778
a group adaptation is a feature of a group that benefits it and that evolved for779
that reason.780
The ‘right reason’ condition may seem unwieldy, referring as it does to what781
would happen if certain hypothetical changes were introduced into the popula-782
tion. It would be nicer if group adaptationism could be defined without such783
complications, in terms of actual statistical parameters. However it is not really784
surprising that this cannot be done. Williams’ concept of group adaptation is785
explicitly causal, and it is a familiar point that causal relations cannot be fully786
defined in statistical terms. The distinction we have been trying to capture,787
between the links holding for the right and wrong reasons, is causal, and will788
usually be detected by contextual analysis, but not always. Where there is in-789
sufficient genetic variation for the regression coefficients of the contextual model790
to be defined, the distinction can only be captured by considering counterfactual791
scenarios.792
Our proposed modification to the definition of group adaptationism – the793
‘right reason’ condition – is expressed in terms of contextual analysis. One794
might think that this provides a reason to favour the contextual over the Price795
approach to multi-level selection. But in fact, the ‘right reason’ condition can be796
characterized using only parameters of the Price equation partition. Recall that797
any p-score for which β1 is undefined must show no within-group variance, and798
vice-versa. We know from Proposition 1 that if a p-score does show within-group799
variance, then β1 = 0 is equivalent to there being no change due to within-group800
selection, i.e. the second term of the Price equation (2) equals zero. Therefore,801
in the modified scenario, where by definition each new actual p-score does show802
within-group variance, the requirement that β′1 = 0 is equivalent to the absence803
of change due to within-group selection on the p-score. Therefore the ‘right804
reason’ condition, like the ‘links holding’ condition, can be equally characterized805
in terms of the contextual or the Price partitions.806
Despite this equivalence, the contextual characterization of the ‘right reason’807
condition is more natural. For the condition β′1 = 0 has a natural causal inter-808
pretation; it means that the gene in question does not directly affect individual809
fitness. By contrast, the condition ‘no change due to within-group selection’810
has no natural interpretation. For note that, for a given p-score, this condition811
is not equivalent to the absence of within-group selection on the p-score. So812
one cannot capture the ‘right reason’ condition by requiring that there be no813
within-group selection in the modified population.814
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10 Conclusion815
The idea that groups can be adaptive units is a venerable one in biology, but816
until Gardner and Grafen’s analysis had never received a sufficiently precise817
formulation. Our approach has been one of critical sympathy with G&G’s anal-818
ysis. We have endorsed the essence of the ‘formal Darwinism’ project – defining819
adaptationism in terms of links between natural selection and optimality – and820
followed G&G’s lead in applying this methodology to the issue of group adapta-821
tionism. Our aim has been two-fold: firstly to explore the logical consequences822
of the distinction between the ‘actual’ and ‘possible’ definitions of ‘scope for823
selection’; and secondly to see whether G&G’s analysis can be reconciled with824
G.C. Williams’ influential concept of group adaptation. Our main results are825
the following.826
On the ‘actual’ definition of ‘scope for selection’:827
1. All five selection / optimality links hold for clonal groups (presuming that828
group fitness is a function of group phenotype alone).829
2. Link 5 fails for competitively repressed groups.830
831
On the ‘possible’ definition of ‘scope for selection’:832
3. All five selection / optimality links hold for competitively repressed groups.833
4. Links 1 and 3 fail for clonal groups (unless there is no within-group vari-834
ance in expected fitness.)835
5. The absence of within-group variance in fitness is both necessary and836
sufficient for the five selection / optimality links to hold.837
6. Links 1, 3 and 5 are jointly equivalent to links 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5.838
7. The links holding can equally be characterized in terms of the Price equa-839
tion or contextual analysis.840
841
In general:842
8. Williams’ concept of group adaptation can be defined as the links holding843
‘for the right reason’.844
9. The links holding ‘for the right reason’ can equally be characterized in845
terms of the Price equation or contextual analysis.846
10. Group adaptationism, in Williams’ sense, cannot be fully characterized847
without reference to causality.848
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A Appendix854
A.1 Clonality versus repression of competition855
Here we show that on the ‘possible’ definition of scope for selection, repression856
of competition suffices to prove link 1, but clonality does not.857
Link 1 can be formally expressed as858
∀p [all groups optimal→ ∆p = 0] (6)
where ‘∀p’ means for all possible p-scores.859
For a given p-score, it follows from equation (2) that ∆p = 0 holds if V arJ(pij) =860
0 for all groups i (case 1), or if V arJ(wij) = 0 for all groups i (case 2). Focusing861
on case 1, we get:862
V arJ(wij) = 0 for all groups i→ (all groups optimal→ ∆p = 0) (7)
Since (7) holds for each p-score, we can generalize to:863
∀p [V arJ(wij) = 0 for all groups i→ (all groups optimal → ∆p = 0)] (8)
This implies:864
∀p [V arJ(wij) = 0 for all groups i]→ ∀p [all groups optimal→ ∆p = 0] (9)
Since the condition V arJ(wij) = 0 for all groups i does not depend on p,865
equation (9) can be re-written:866
V arJ(wij) = 0 for all groups i→ ∀p [all groups optimal→ ∆p = 0] (10)
Equation (10) tells us that if all groups are competitively repressed, then867
link 1 holds on the ‘possible’ definition of scope for selection.868
Now consider case 2. For a given p-score, we have:869
V arJ(pij) = 0 for all groups i→ (all groups optimal→ ∆p = 0) (11)
Just as (7) leads to (9), so (11) leads to:870
∀p [V arJ(pij) = 0 for all groups i]→ ∀p [all groups optimal→ ∆p = 0] (12)
The LHS of (12) says that no possible p-score shows within-group variance,871
which is impossible. So (12) is vacuously true, but does not say that link 1 holds872
if all groups are clonal. The latter claim is formally expressed as:873
∀ actual p [V arJ(pij) = 0 for all groups i]→ ∀p [all groups optimal→ ∆p = 0]
(13)
However (13) does not follow from (11).874
So under the ‘possible’ definition of scope for selection, link 1 holds for875
competitively repressed groups but not for clonal groups.876
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A.2 Main results877
Proposition 1. For a given p-score:878
∀i V arJ(wij) = 0879
⇒ ∀i CovJ(pij , wij) = 0880
⇒ EI [CovJ(pij , wij)] = 0881
⇔ β1 = 0 or ∀i V arJ(pij) = 0882
Proof. The first two implications are trivial, so we just prove the last equiva-883
lence.884
Recall the Price partition:885
w∆p = CovI(wi, pi) + EI [CovJ(pij , wij)] (2)
And the contextual one :886
w∆p = β2V arI(pi) + β1V arIxJ(pij) (13)
1. In the right-to-left direction:887
Suppose that either β1 = 0 or ∀i V arJ(pij) = 0.888
• If ∀i V arJ(pij) = 0, then both terms of the Price partition are zero, as889
are both terms of the contextual partition.890
• If β1 = 0, then from the contextual partition we have w∆p = β2V arI(pi).891
Now consider the group term of the Price equation, CovI(pi, wi). This892
always equals CovIxJ(pi, wij). Substituting for wij using regression equa-893
tion wij = β1pij + β2pi + eij , we get CovIxJ(pi, wij)= β2CovI(pi, pi) =894
β2V arI(pi). Therefore CovI(pi, wi) = β2V arI(pi) = w∆p, so EI [CovJ(pij , wij)] =895
0.896
2. In the left-to-right direction:897
Suppose that EI [CovJ(pij , wij)] = 0. Therefore, w∆p = CovI(pi, wi) = CovIxJ(pi, wij).898
Again, substitute in the regression equation wij = β1pij+β2pi+eij , which gives:899
w∆p = CovIxJ(pi, wij) = β1V arI(pi) + β2V arI(pi).900
But the contextual partition says that:901
w∆p = β2V arI(pi) + β1V arIxJ(pij).902
Therefore, β1V arI(pi) = β1V arIxJ(pij), which implies that either β1 = 0, or903
else V arI(pi) = V arIxJ(pij).904
If V arI(pi) = V arIxJ(pij), then the total variance in p-score equals the between-905
group variance, which implies that ∀i V arJ(pij) = 0.906
907
Lemma 1. ∀i V arJ(wij) = 0 ⇔ ∀p ∀i CovJ(pij , wij) = 0908
Proof. The left-to-right direction is trivial. In the right-to-left direction, suppose909
that ∀p ∀i CovJ(pij , wij) = 0 but that there is some within-group variance in910
fitness, i.e. ∃i V arJ(wij) 6= 0. Assume without loss of generality that there is911
only one group g in which fitnesses vary. Now consider the p-score p′ defined as912
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follows: p′gj = 1 for all individuals j in group g such that wgj > wg, and p
′
gj = 0913
for all other individuals in g. By construction, in group g, CovJ(pgj , wgj) > 0,914
which contradicts the hypothesis.915
916
Lemma 2. ∀p ∀i CovJ(wij , pij) = 0 ⇔ ∀p EI [CovJ(wij , pij)] = 0917
Proof. The left-to-right direction is obvious: the average of components equal to918
zero is zero. In the right-to-left direction, suppose that ∀ p-score EI [CovJ(wij , pij)] =919
0, but that there exists a p-score p and a group g such that CovJ(wgj , pgj)] > 0.920
As the non-zero covariances must average out, it follows that there exists a921
group g′ such that CovJ(wg′j , pg′j) < 0.922
Assume without loss of generality that g and g′ are the only groups in which923
the covariances are not zero. Recall that a p-score is just a function IxJ → R.924
Let a new p-score p′ be defined as follows: ∀i 6= g′ ∀j p′ij = pij , and ∀j p′g′j =925
1− pg′j . Informally put, p′ is identical to p in general, except in the groups for926
which the covariance is negative, where they are opposite.927
So ∀i 6= g′ CovJ(wij , p′ij) = CovJ(wij , pij) ≥ 0; but CovJ(wg′j , p′g′j) =928
−CovJ(wg′j , pg′j) > 0.929
Overall, ∀i CovJ(wij , p′ij) ≥ 0, and the inequality is strict for groups g and930
g′. As a consequence, EI [CovJ(wij , p′ij)] > 0, which contradicts the hypothesis.931
932
Proposition 2.933
∀i V arJ(wij) = 0934
⇔ ∀p ∀i CovJ(pij , wij) = 0935
⇔ ∀p EI [CovJ(pij , wij)] = 0936
⇔ ∀p [β1 = 0 or ∀i V arJ(pij) = 0]937
Proof. The first equivalence corresponds to Lemma 1; the second equivalence938
to Lemma 2. The third one is trivially obtained from the final equivalence of939
Proposition 1 (if an equivalence holds for any given p, then it holds for all p).940
Proposition 3.941
“links 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 hold”942
⇔ “links 1, 3 and 5 hold”943
⇔ ∀i V arJ(wij) = 0944
⇔ ∀p ∀i CovJ(pij , wij) = 0945
⇔ ∀p EI [CovJ(pij , wij)] = 0946
⇔ ∀p [β1 = 0 or ∀i V arJ(pij) = 0]947
Proof. The last three equivalences correspond to Proposition 2. Gardner and948
Grafen (2009, pp. 12–13) have already proved that ∀p ∀i CovJ(pij , wij) = 0949
implies links 1-5, which trivially imply links 1, 3 and 5. Thus we only have to950
show that links 1, 3 and 5 jointly imply one of the last four conditions above.951
To show that links 1, 3 and 5 jointly imply ∀i V arJ(wij) = 0, suppose that952
there is some group i such that V arJ(wij) 6= 0. There are three possible cases:953
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• all groups are optimal. Then, for any p-score, there will be no change due954
to between-group selection. However, because within-group fitnesses are955
not identical in group i, we can find a p-score for which EI [CovJ(pij , wij)] 6=956
0, by Lemmas 1 and 2. Therefore there is scope for selection, so link 1 is957
false.958
• all groups are equally suboptimal. By the same reasoning as in the previ-959
ous case, there is scope for selection, so link 3 is false.960
• groups vary in optimality. Since within-group fitnesses are not identical in961
group i, we can find a p-score for which EI [CovJ(pij , wij)] 6= 0. Therefore,962
the change in this p-score, ∆p is not equal to CovI(pi, wi), so link 5 is false.963
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